In the literature, the consensus about the importance of the independence of the central banks towards stable economic growth has been proven (e.g. Barro and Gordon 1983). The empirical papers studying this problem follow Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) central bank independence index which does not include some important factors such as rule of law in the given country and defines the components of independence too generally. In this project, we aim to build an alternative index that will measure the central bank independence in more detail which will account for the rule of law and other relevant aspects that indirectly affect the true independence of the central bank. Obtaining the index, we will study whether the independence of the central bank has a positive effect on maintaining the given central bank's primary target. Furthermore, in this research, we aim to test whether our results differ from the previous findings in the empirical literature on the central bank independence and its effect on stable prices. Based on the obtained results, an optimal legislature of the central bank's independence shall be suggested. This panel dataset provides an assessment of the independence of central banks in 21 OECD countries (excluding the Eurozone), focusing on their monetary policy autonomy as determined by legislation in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Our data collection adopts a novel approach, building upon theinnovating methodology proposed by Cukierman et al. (1992), while incorporating revised components of the index that place greater emphasis on current standards of central bank independence. Additionally, we introduce new criteria to evaluate budgetary independence, an important aspect of central bank autonomy (Swinburne and Castello-Branco, 1991). The dataset serves as a valuable resource for empirical studies seeking to analyze the impact of monetary policy independence on economic performance. Furthermore, policymakers can draw insights from this index to enhance legislative frameworks and promote stronger performance in central bank independence.

We collected the data by primarily reviewing the IMF Central Bank Legislation database and legislation from 21 OECD countries (excluding the Eurozone). We employed a novel central bank independence (CBI) index, which builds upon the methodology developed by Cukierman et al. (1992). This index systematically breaks down independence into 14 distinct elements, categorized as personal, functional-institutional, financial, and budgetary independence. Our data acquisition process involved detailed evaluating of the central bank independence for the years 2010, 2015, and 2020, aligning with the corresponding collection years of the IMF Central Bank Legislation Database.