Two are Few and Four are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopoly [Dataset]

DOI

In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of firms in an industry. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying oligopolies with two, three, four, and five firms in a unified frame. With two firms we find some collusion. Three-firm oligopolies tend to produce outputs at the Nash level. Markets with four or five firms are never collusive and typically settle at or above the Cournot outcome. Some of those markets are actually quite competitive with outputs close to the Walrasian outcome.

Identifier
DOI https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10017
Related Identifier https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2002.10.002
Metadata Access https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_datacite&identifier=doi:10.11588/data/10017
Provenance
Creator Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Jörg
Publisher heiDATA
Contributor Oechssler, Jörg; Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; HeiDATA: Heidelberg Research Data Repository
Publication Year 2014
Rights info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
OpenAccess false
Contact Oechssler, Jörg (Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics)
Representation
Resource Type Dataset
Format text/tab-separated-values; application/octet-stream; application/x-gzip
Size 22744; 51769; 79933
Version 1.1
Discipline Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Aquaculture; Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Aquaculture and Veterinary Medicine; Life Sciences; Social Sciences; Social and Behavioural Sciences; Soil Sciences
Spatial Coverage Heidelberg, Germany